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LITIGATION, ARBITRATION, AND THE 
TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE LAW 
CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK* 
INTRODUCTION 
That arbitration has replaced litigation as the leading method of 
transnational dispute resolution has become a cliché.1 But like many 
clichés, neither its empirical basis nor its broader implications are 
entirely clear. From the perspective of actual or prospective 
disputants, the choice between litigation and arbitration, while often 
difficult, generally boils down to an analysis of a fairly standard set of 
characteristics that distinguish these two dispute resolution 
techniques.2 You cannot, for example, pick your judge, but you can 
pick your arbitrator; litigation comes with preexisting rules of civil 
procedure, whereas the parties can tailor their own rules for 
governing the arbitral process; and in contrast to the transparency of 
litigation, steps can be taken to keep arbitral proceedings 
confidential. Arbitration also is potentially faster and less costly than 
litigation.3 The implications of litigation versus arbitration are, in 
other words, relatively clear from a disputant-oriented perspective. 
As important as these considerations are for transnational 
lawyering, this article instead provides a governance-oriented 
perspective on transnational litigation and transnational arbitration. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.  I thank Charles 
Brower and Jim Holbrook for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
 1. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: 
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 225 (2003) (“[M]ost 
trade experts would agree that private arbitration has eclipsed national adjudication as the 
preferred method for resolving international commercial disputes.”); RICHARD GARNETT, 
HENRY GABRIEL, JEFF WAINCYMER & JUDD EPSTEIN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2000) (“Arbitration is the dominant method 
of resolving private party disputes in international commerce.”). 
 2. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION 
AGREEMENTS: PLANNING, DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 5-15 (1999) (enumerating the 
distinguishing characteristics of transnational arbitration and transnational litigation, and 
proposing general guidelines for selecting the appropriate dispute resolution method). 
 3. Id. at 7-8; GARNETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 12-13. 
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Governance-oriented analysis of transnational law has two central 
features.4 First, it focuses on the implications of transnational law not 
only for particular disputants, but also for the behavior of 
transnational actors more generally.5 To help explore these 
implications, I take Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser’s well 
known “shadow of the law” metaphor—used by them to elucidate the 
influence of divorce law and court decisions on the behavior of 
divorcing couples “outside the courtroom”6—and extend it to 
transnational law and transnational activity. I will refer in this article 
to the “transnational shadow of the law” to highlight the influence 
that domestic law and domestic courts have on transnational activity, 
including transnational arbitration.7 Second, the governance-oriented 
approach involves not only doctrinal analysis of transnational law, but 
also descriptive, causal, and normative analysis of transnational law in 
action–including how judges actually decide cases.8 
 
 4. See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 101 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 166, 167-68 (2007) (defining governance-oriented analysis and applying it to 
forum non conveniens) [hereinafter Whytock I]; Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and 
Global Governance: The Politics of Private International Law 257-59 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Duke University), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/101-
61/452 (refining governance-oriented analysis and applying it to forum non conveniens and 
international choice of law) [hereinafter Whytock II]. 
 5. I use the term “transnational” to describe actors or activities with connections to more 
than one state. Those connections can be territorial, when the activity or its effects touch the 
territory of more than one state, or they can be based on legal relationships between a state and 
the actors engaged in or affected by that activity, such as nationality or citizenship. In 
international law and international relations theory, the term “international” technically refers 
to interactions between unitary states. I use the term “transnational” to include nonstate actors 
within the scope of this article. Following Jessup, I define “transnational law” as the body of law 
“which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers,” a concept meant to 
embody both public and private international law and explicitly including domestic legal rules 
that apply to transnational activity. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1-2, 70, 106 
(1956). 
 6. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-51, 968 (1979); see also Martin Shapiro, Courts, in 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 321, 329 
(Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975) (“[L]egalized bargaining [or negotiation] 
under the shadow supervision of an available court . . . is not purely mediatory, because the 
bargain struck will depend in part on the ‘legal’ strength of the parties, that is, predictions of 
how each would fare in court.”). 
 7. See generally Whytock I, supra note 4, at 167; Whytock II, supra note 4, at 22-31; Cf. 
Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlements in 
GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158 (2000) (drawing attention to the shadow 
cast by the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement procedure on international trade 
negotiations). 
 8. Whytock I, supra note 4, at 167-68; Whytock II, supra note 4, at 257; See generally 
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From a governance-oriented perspective, litigation and 
arbitration are not only distinct methods of transnational dispute 
resolution. They also provide foundations for two different forms of 
global governance: transnational judicial governance and 
transnational private governance.9 From this perspective, the 
relationship between litigation and arbitration not only affects the 
micro-level decisions of individual disputants regarding the dispute 
resolution method that best advances their respective interests. It also 
has implications for global governance, that is, for how and by whom 
the rules of transnational activity are prescribed, applied, and 
enforced.10 
This article explores these implications in three parts.11 First, I 
explain the concept of transnational judicial governance, describing 
the role of domestic court decisionmaking in the regulation of 
transnational activity. Next, I explain the concept of transnational 
private governance, and argue that transnational arbitration is an 
example of this form of governance. I then turn to the relationship 
between litigation and transnational judicial governance on the one 
hand, and arbitration and transnational private governance on the 
other hand. I point to empirical evidence suggesting that the 
conventional wisdom may overestimate the extent to which 
transnational arbitration has replaced litigation. And I argue that 
arbitration is only partially autonomous from transnational judicial 
governance. Domestic courts perform a governance support function 
for transnational arbitration,12 and except in narrow circumstances in 
which private enforcement is possible on the basis of reputational 
sanctions, transnational arbitration itself operates in the transnational 
shadow of the law. 
I conclude by drawing attention to the complexity of the 
relationship between transnational judicial governance and 
transnational arbitration. On the one hand, judicial monitoring of 
 
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910) (“[I]f we look 
closely, distinctions between law in the books and law in action, between the rules that purport 
to govern the relations of man and man and those that in fact govern them, will appear, and it 
will be found that today also the distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is 
often a very real and a very deep one.”). 
 9. For a detailed definition and theoretical and empirical analyses of transnational judicial 
governance, see Whytock II, supra note 4. 
 10. See ANNE METTE KJAER, GOVERNANCE 10 (2004). 
 11. The focus here is on U.S. courts. 
 12. Whytock I, supra note 4, at 167; Whytock II, supra note 4, at 28-29. 
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transnational arbitration is minimal; on the other hand, arbitration 
generally depends on domestic courts for enforcement.  This raises a 
variety of normative concerns, including whether transnational 
arbitration can adequately respond to the negative externalities of 
cross-border commercial activity. 
I. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE 
From the perspective of an actual or prospective disputant, 
litigation is one option among others for resolving transnational 
disputes which carries with it particular advantages and disadvantages 
for each of the disputants. From a governance-oriented perspective, 
however, transnational litigation is the foundation of a form of global 
governance, whereby judges make decisions that not only directly 
affect the parties to particular disputes, but also indirectly regulate 
the behavior of actors who engage in activity in the transnational 
shadow of the law. I call this form of governance “transnational 
judicial governance.”13 
At the core of transnational judicial governance are two 
allocative functions—one jurisdictional, the other substantive—that 
domestic courts perform in the course of transnational litigation. 
Jurisdictionally, domestic courts allocate governance authority over 
transnational activity. As international relations scholar Miles Kahler 
puts it, first and prior to all other questions about global governance 
is “Who governs?”14 Domestic courts help answer this question. For 
example, by making subject matter jurisdiction and forum non 
conveniens decisions, they help allocate adjudicative authority among 
states. And by making international choice-of-law decisions, they 
allocate prescriptive authority. Domestic courts also help allocate 
governance authority between public and private actors. For example, 
they do so when they decide whether to enforce transnational 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.15 
 
 13. I sketch my concept of transnational judicial governance only briefly here. For a more 
comprehensive discussion, see Whytock II, supra note 4, ch. 1.  See also Christopher A. 
Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance (Aug. 11, 2006), http://ssrn.com/auth-
or=386558. 
 14. Miles Kahler, Global Governance Redefined, (Oct. 2004), http://irpshome.ucsd.ed-
u/faculty/mkahler/GlobGov_10.04.doc. 
 15. Of course, these allocative functions correspond to several important branches of 
private international law. However, the governance-oriented approach emphasizes not only 
what private international law doctrine says, but what the domestic courts applying it actually 
do—that is, it focuses on how they actually allocate governance authority. 
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In addition to the allocation of governance authority, domestic 
courts perform a substantive allocative function: they allocate rights 
and resources among transnational actors. It is well understood that 
the allocation of rights and resources among litigants is a general 
judicial function.16 However, it is only recently that scholars have 
started to focus on the implications of this function for transnational 
activity. For example, “transnational public law litigation” is litigation 
in which “[p]rivate individuals, government officials, and nations sue 
one another directly, and are sued directly, in a variety of judicial 
fora, most prominently domestic courts,” based on rights derived 
from both domestic and international law.17 When these cases result 
in the award of compensatory or punitive damages, domestic courts 
are allocating economic resources among state and nonstate actors.18 
More fundamentally, these decisions implicate basic values of safety 
and human dignity.19 In “transnational regulatory litigation,” domestic 
courts apply explicitly regulatory domestic legal rules to transnational 
activity, thus allocating rights and resources among the participating 
actors.20 More broadly, as Hannah Buxbaum argues, these cases not 
only close gaps in international regulation, but also “give domestic 
courts a role in the transnational process of articulating and defending 
global norms.”21 “Transnational private litigation” involves claims 
based on private law, including the law of torts, property, and 
 
 16. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, From Public Law to Public Policy, or the “Public” in “Public 
Law,” 5 POL. SCI. & POL. 410, 413 (1972) (adopting the definition of politics as the authoritative 
allocation of values, and arguing that judicial decisionmaking plays a central role in domestic 
political processes precisely because law is an important instrument of value allocation). 
 17. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J. 2347, 2348-49 
(1991). In the United States, these suits are typically based on the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing that federal district courts have jurisdiction over any civil 
action brought by an alien for a tort committed in violation of international law), as interpreted 
by the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
 18. However, plaintiffs that are successful in transnational public law litigation against 
states or state officials rarely are able to fully collect compensation. See id. at 2368 (“[N]o 
Filartiga-type plaintiff has apparently collected full compensation for his injuries . . . .”). 
 19. These are among the values identified by Myres McDougal as being allocated by the 
authoritative decisionmaking that constitutes international law.  Myres S. McDougal, Some 
Basic Theoretical Concepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry, 4 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 337, 343, 349 (1960). 
 20. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251 
(2006). 
 21. Id. at 254. 
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contracts.22 These fields of private law—although generally not 
explicitly regulatory—are nevertheless policy instruments by which 
states authoritatively allocate economic rights and resources.23 By 
applying private law principles in transnational litigation, domestic 
courts help implement these allocative policies transnationally. As 
Robert Wai argues, the function of private law is “not simply 
facilitation of transactions, but also compensation for harms and 
social regulation of transnational conduct.”24 
Importantly, both the jurisdictional and substantive allocative 
decisions made by domestic courts in transnational litigation have 
shadow effects—that is, effects on the behavior of transnational 
actors “outside the courtroom.”25 By publishing these decisions, 
domestic courts provide information about how they are likely to 
make similar decisions under similar circumstances in the future, thus 
influencing the strategic behavior of transnational actors who acquire 
this information.26 For example, decisions allocating adjudicative and 
prescriptive authority affect transnational forum shopping by 
litigants.27 They can also affect predictability regarding which state’s 
rules apply to particular transnational activity, thus influencing levels 
of compliance, and arguably influencing international regulatory 
competition as well.28 Substantively, judicial allocation of rights and 
 
 22. Robert Wai, Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance, in 
CRITICIZING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 243, 243-61 (Markus Lederer & Philipp S. Müller eds., 
2005). 
 23. See Shapiro supra note 15, at 413 (arguing that private law is just as much an instrument 
of authoritative value allocation as “public” or “regulatory”). See also Martin Shapiro, Public 
Law and Judicial Politics, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE II 365, 366 
(Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993) (The ‘private’ law of property and contract authoritatively allocates 
most of the values in a capitalist society.”). 
 24. Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global 
Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471, 471 (2005). 
 25. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 951, 972-73 (discussing the shadow of the 
law in the context of domestic divorce cases). 
 26. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution: 
Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 64 
(1998) (“When a judge decides, the lawmaking effect of the decision is always twofold. First, in 
settling the dispute at hand, the judge produces a legal act that is particular (it binds the two 
disputants) and retrospective (it resolves an existing dispute). Second, in justifying the decision, 
the judge signals that she will settle similar cases similarly in the future; this legal act is a general 
and prospective one (it affects future and potential [disputants]).”). 
 27. See Whytock II, supra note 4, at 25-8. 
 28. Id. 
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resources also has implications that extend beyond particular cases.29 
Thus, domestic courts help define the shape, size, and content of 
the transnational shadow of the law. Marc Galanter refers to “the 
radiating effects of courts,” explaining that: 
The contribution of courts to resolving disputes cannot be 
equated with their resolution of those disputes that are fully 
adjudicated. The principal contribution of courts to dispute 
resolution is the provision of a background of norms and 
procedures, against which negotiations and regulation in both 
private and governmental settings takes place. This 
contribution includes, but is not exhausted by, communication 
to prospective litigants of what might transpire if one of them 
sought a judicial resolution.30 
The important point here is that these radiating effects extend beyond 
borders. 
II. ARBITRATION AS TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Disputant-oriented analysis focuses on the advantages and 
disadvantages of arbitration relative to litigation for particular 
disputants involved in particular transnational interactions. From a 
governance-oriented perspective, however, arbitration is not only an 
alternative method of dispute resolution, but also an example of an 
alternative form of global governance: transnational private 
governance. “[T]ransnational private governance” is the governance 
of transnational activity by nonstate or “private” actors. It involves 
cooperation by nonstate actors “in order to establish rules and 
standards of behaviour . . . . Non-state actors not only formulate 
norms, but often also have a key role in their enforcement.”31 Thus, 
 
 29. For example, in transnational public law litigation, judges are not only resolving 
particular disputes, but also “declaring (or not declaring) international norms that litigants 
transport to other fora for use in political bargaining. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public 
Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J. 2347, 2395 (1991). Similarly, transnational regulatory litigation 
not only binds the litigants, but also can “enable national courts to participate in implementing 
effective regulatory strategies for global markets.” Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 316. For its part, 
transnational private litigation “might be able to introduce [new] policy values (sometimes 
through new policy actors) into political negotiations or decision making in other venues, 
domestic or international.” Wai, supra note 24, at 250. 
 30. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT 
COURTS 117, 121 (Keith O. Boyum & Lynn Mater eds., 1983). 
 31. Andreas Nölke & Jean-Christophe Graz, Limits to the Legitimacy of Transnational 
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transnational private governance “goes much further than traditional 
lobbying in allowing private actors an active role in regulation 
itself.”32 
In contrast to transnational judicial governance, where the 
governors are public officials and the law of the forum state (or the 
law of a foreign state to which the forum state’s choice-of-law 
principles point) ordinarily provides the applicable rules, arbitration 
can be understood as a form of private governance. The arbitrator is a 
private individual who does not act as a government representative. 
More fundamentally, the arbitral process is itself the result of private 
agreement, the disputants generally being free to select the arbitrator 
and applicable procedural and substantive rules. These rules may 
include nonstate rules or customs.33 
Whereas legal scholars typically study arbitration from a 
disputant-oriented perspective,34 political scientists are beginning to 
examine it from a governance-oriented perspective. For example, 
Alec Stone Sweet argues that the Lex Mercatoria—which he defines 
as “the body of substantive law and dispute resolution rules and 
procedures,” including arbitration, that govern transnational trading 
relations35—is an increasingly important form of transnational private 
governance: 
Over the past four decades, the transnational business 
community has successfully built a private system of 
transnational governance: the new Lex Mercatoria. The actors 
 
Private Governance 2, unpublished paper, available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csg-
r/activitiesnews/conferences/conference2007/papers/Noelke.pdf. 
 32. Id. 
 33. BORN, supra note 2, at 2. 
 34. But see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 773, 773-74 (2002) (arguing that international commercial arbitration (ICA) “has had an 
enormous impact upon . . . the structuring of a de facto international legal system, and the 
development of a substantive world law of commerce. In a word, ICA has been a vital engine in 
the creation of a transborder rule of law”); and YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, 
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 3 (1996) (tracing the emergence of a global system of 
private justice to “new kinds of ‘courts’—international commercial arbitration—and a special 
body of ‘law’—the so-called lex mercatoria”). 
 35. Alec Stone Sweet, Islands of Transnational Governance, in ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 323, 329-30 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
Stone Sweet, Islands]; Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational 
Governance, 13 J. EURO. PUB. POL’Y 627 (2006) [hereinafter Stone Sweet, Transnational 
Governance]. See also MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 292-95 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002). 
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who operate this system—firms, their lawyers, international 
arbitrators, and legal academics—have evolved, and use, ‘a-
national’ principles of contract and a system of private ‘courts’ 
to organize and regulate cross-border commercial exchange.36 
The main point is that arbitration is not only an alternative form of 
dispute resolution, but also part of an alternative form of global 
governance—transnational private governance. 
III. ESCAPING THE TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE 
LAW? 
Taking a governance-oriented perspective, I have argued that 
litigation and arbitration are not only alternative methods of 
transnational dispute resolution, but also foundations for two 
alternative forms of global governance: transnational judicial 
governance and transnational private governance. This argument 
raises fundamental questions: To what extent are transnational actors 
using arbitration to circumvent state regulation of their activity? To 
what extent, in other words, are they using arbitration to escape the 
transnational shadow of the law? And what are the implications for 
global governance? Are we witnessing the privatization of global 
governance, a shift from transnational judicial governance (and other 
forms of public governance) to transnational private governance? 
I will venture no definitive answer here. Nevertheless, I will 
attempt to make some modest progress by elucidating two related 
issues that need more attention if we are to develop a sound 
understanding of the relationship between litigation and transnational 
judicial governance on the one hand, and arbitration and 
transnational private governance on the other. First, how extensive is 
the trend from litigation to arbitration in transnational dispute 
resolution? Second, what is the relationship between domestic courts 
and arbitration? To the extent arbitration depends on domestic courts 
 
 36. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 627. See also CUTLER, supra 
note 1, at 183 (“The expansion of privatized dispute settlement through private, delocalized, and 
transnationalized international commercial arbitration is [] part of a corporate strategy to 
further disembed commercial law and practice from the “public” sphere and to reembed them 
in the “private” sphere, free from democratic and social control. The devolution of authority to 
resolve disputes and to enforce agreements to the private sphere through the increasing 
legitimacy of private arbitration, and the reassertion of merchant autonomy as the substantive 
norm, are perfecting this reconfiguration of political authority.”); SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, 
supra note 35, at 292 (“[T]he Lex Mercatoria is rapidly emerging as a relatively comprehensive 
system of governance. . . .”); Stone Sweet, Islands, supra note 35, at 334. 
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for its effectiveness as a system of transnational private governance, 
the shift from litigation to arbitration might actually vindicate the 
importance of transnational judicial governance—in particular its 
governance support function—and suggest that it might not be so 
easy after all for transnational actors to fully escape the transnational 
shadow of the law. 
A. Trends in Transnational Litigation and Transnational Arbitration 
First, to what extent is arbitration replacing litigation as a 
method of transnational dispute resolution?  In disputes arising 
between parties without preexisting relationships, arbitration is not 
likely to replace arbitration. As Gary Born notes,  
Almost all international arbitrations occur pursuant to 
arbitration clauses contained in commercial contracts. It is, of 
course, possible for parties to agree to submit an existing 
dispute to arbitration, and this sometimes happens. . . . 
Typically, however, it is difficult to negotiate a submission 
agreement [or “compromis”] once a concrete dispute has arisen 
and litigation tactics have been explored.37  
For example, individual plaintiffs in transnational tort suits are 
unlikely to have an ex ante arbitration agreement with the defendant, 
and often will prefer the broad discovery rules and jury available with 
litigation. Thus, litigation is likely to remain an important method for 
resolving tort disputes arising from the negative externalities of 
transnational activity. 
Regarding transnational commerce, on the other hand, the 
conventional wisdom is that arbitration has virtually replaced 
litigation.38 Garnett et al. assert that “[a]rbitration is the dominant 
method of resolving private party disputes in international 
commerce.”39 According to Thomas Carbonneau, “[t]he status of 
arbitration as the procedure of choice in transnational commerce can 
no longer be seriously challenged.”40 
 
 37. BORN, supra note 2, at 37. 
 38. See, e.g., CUTLER, supra note 1, at 225 (“[M]ost trade experts would agree that private 
arbitration has eclipsed national adjudication as the preferred method for resolving 
international commercial disputes.”); Walter Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy: From 
Litigation to Arbitration, 55 INT’L ORG. 919, 920 (2001) (“Lawyers and judges agree that there is 
now clear evidence of something of a world movement . . . towards international arbitration.”). 
 39. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
 40. Thomas Carbonneau, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, in LEX 
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There is, however, an emerging contrarian view. Theodore 
Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller find that “large corporate actors do 
not systematically embrace arbitration. International contracts 
include arbitration clauses more than domestic contracts, but also at a 
surprisingly low rate. . . . [C]orporate representatives believe that 
litigation can add value over arbitration.”41 And as Thomas 
Stipanowich concludes in a survey of empirical research on the 
relationship between litigation and arbitration: “As for litigation, to 
paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors of its demise are greatly 
exaggerated.”42 
Unfortunately, little data is available for assessing these 
divergent views.43 On the transnational judicial governance side of the 
ledger, litigation continues to be alive and well, at least in the United 
States. 253,273 civil cases were filed in the U.S. district courts in 
2005,44 and an estimated 16.6 million were filed in U.S. state courts in 
the same year.45 Moreover, overall civil litigation rates increased in 
the last decade in both the federal46 and state47 judicial systems. 
The problem is that litigation rates in general do not necessarily 
reflect transnational litigation rates in particular. In fact, an empirical 
study by Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg shows that the 
 
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 23 (Thomas 
E. Carbonneau ed., revised vol. 1998). 
 41. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical 
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 335, 373-74 (2007). 
 42. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of 
“Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 843, 911 (2004). 
 43. See id. at 1 (noting that a “fundamental problem” faced by scholars studying the 
relationship between litigation and various forms of alternative dispute resolution like 
mediation and arbitration is the “paucity of useful, reliable information”).  See also Eisenberg & 
Miller, supra note 41, at 345 (“Little information exists about arbitration clause incidence in 
sophisticated contracts . . . .”). 
 44. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table S-7 (2007), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/completejudicialbusiness.pdf. 
 45. National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts: A National 
Perspective from the Court Statistics Project 27 (2006), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2006_files/EWSC-2007WholeDocument.pdf. 
 46. In 1995, 248,335 civil cases were filed in U.S. federal district courts; in 2005, 253, 273 
were filed. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 44, at Table 
4.4. 
 47. Civil litigation in state courts increased by fifteen and five percent between 1996 and 
2005 for limited jurisdiction and unified/general jurisdiction courts, respectively. National 
Center for State Courts, supra note 45, at 12. 
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rate of one type of transnational litigation—alienage jurisdiction 
cases—is declining. Using data collected by the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts, they show that the number of alienage 
cases—that is, cases over which the U.S. district courts have 
jurisdiction because the dispute is between “citizens of a [U.S.] State 
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”48—has substantially 
declined since 1986.49 Might it be that this decline is due to a shift 
from litigation to arbitration?50 
But this is only a small piece of the transnational litigation 
picture. Clermont and Eisenberg exclude from their analysis cases 
involving foreign nations.51 Moreover, aside from the information on 
alienage cases, the Administrative Office data does not distinguish 
transnational litigation from purely domestic litigation. Consequently, 
the Clermont and Eisenberg study does not identify transnational 
litigation in U.S. federal district courts on jurisdictional grounds other 
than alienage, such as diversity cases between two U.S. citizens 
involving activity with a transnational dimension, and federal 
 
 48. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1940). 
 49. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. 
Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 441, 461 tbl.3 (2007) [hereinafter 
Clermont & Eisenberg II]. As the authors explain in an earlier article, one reason for this drop 
has to do with a legal change rather than litigation rates: in 1988, 28 U.S.C. §1332 was amended 
to classify permanent resident aliens as U.S. state citizens rather than foreign citizens. Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 
1124 n.15 (1996) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg I]. 
 50. A simultaneous decline in transnational litigation rates and rise in transnational 
arbitration rates would at least circumstantially support the proposition that there has been a 
shift from public to private forms of global governance. However, such evidence would not be 
conclusive. It also would be necessary to demonstrate a relationship between these trends. Even 
with perfect data on transnational litigation and transnational arbitration rates over time, this 
would be difficult because of the non-fungibility of litigation and arbitration. Some disputes are 
unlikely to be arbitrated at all—take, for example, tort claims involving parties having no a 
priori relationship and therefore no preexisting arbitration agreement. Changes in the rate of 
this type of litigation would not imply changes in arbitration rates. Conversely, there may be 
some disputes that would not be likely to be litigated even without the option of arbitration—
for example, disputes with insufficient value to justify the time or expense of litigation. Since 
such disputes will not be litigated anyway, changes in the rates of arbitration of such disputes 
would not imply changes in litigation rates. In addition, litigation and arbitration do not exhaust 
the available alternatives for transnational dispute resolution. Shifts to (or away from) 
negotiation or mediation may help explain changes in the rates of litigation and arbitration. 
Most fundamentally, interpretation of the data is difficult due to the lack of measures of the 
underlying causes of disputes: changes in litigation or arbitration rates may be due to overall 
changes in the rate of disputing, not changes in the popularity of one dispute resolution method 
or another. 
 51. Clermont & Eisenberg, II, supra note 49, at 452 n.39. 
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question cases involving a non-U.S. party or otherwise involving 
transnational activity. 
Furthermore, though most litigation in the United States is filed 
in state rather than federal courts,52 the Administrative Office data 
does not include state court cases. This means that inferences based 
on the Administrative Office data run the risk of grossly 
underestimating the total volume of transnational litigation in U.S. 
courts, and inaccurately describing overall transnational litigation 
trends. For now, it is difficult to do more than speculate about 
whether transnational litigation in general is characterized by the 
same trends that characterize alienage cases in the U.S. federal 
district courts. 
As for transnational private governance, “systematic knowledge 
of arbitration is thin”53 and available data on arbitration rates is 
mixed. On the one hand, it seems undeniable that the popularity of 
arbitration increased dramatically over the course of the last century. 
As Stone Sweet notes: 
The number of arbitral centers that handle transnational 
business disputes has grown at an astounding pace. In 1910, 
there were ten arbitration houses; there were over 100 by 1985; 
and today there are more than 150. . . . At the [International 
Chamber of Commerce], the oldest, biggest, and most 
important such institution, traders filed some 3,000 disputes for 
arbitration during the 1920 to 1980 period, more than 3,500 
during the 1990s, and 5,250 during the 1996 to 2005 period 
(footnote omitted). By 2004, the annual number of filings 
exceeded 550, and the annual number of awards rendered 
exceeded 350.54 
Stone Sweet estimates that seventy percent of the cases filed with the 
 
 52. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP, RONALD STIDHAM & KENNETH L. MANNING, JUDICIAL 
PROCESS IN AMERICA 67 (7th ed. 2007) (“The lion’s share of the nation’s judicial business exists 
at the state, not the national, level. The fact that judges adjudicate several hundred thousand 
cases a year is impressive; the fact that state courts handle several million in a year is 
overwhelming . . . .”).  In 2005, 253,273 civil cases were filed in the U.S. district courts.  Id. at 47. 
 53. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 348. 
 54. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 636 see also Carbonneau, 
supra note 34, at 796 (noting that the American Arbitration Association’s International Center 
for Dispute Resolution has administered more than 1,000 arbitration cases and has an annual 
caseload approach 400); Mattli, supra note 38, at 920 (“The number of arbitration forums has 
grown from a dozen or so in the 1970s to more than one hundred in the 1990s, and the caseload 
of major arbitral institutions has more than doubled during the same period.”). 
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ICC are “inter-regional” in the sense that the parties are based on 
different continents,55 and states that “[t]oday, far more than 90 
percent of all transnational commercial contracts contain an 
arbitration clause.”56 
On the other hand, a series of recent empirical studies indicates 
that arbitration in general—and transnational arbitration in 
particular—might not be as pervasive as some observers suggest. In 
1997, Cornell University conducted a survey study on the use of 
alternative dispute resolution by Fortune 1000 companies.57 Although 
41.6 percent of respondents reported that they used arbitration 
“occasionally” to resolve disputes, only 20.6 percent reported that 
they used arbitration “very frequently” or “frequently,” and 37.7 
percent reported that they did so “rarely” or “not at all.”58 
Another study, conducted by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey 
Miller, analyzed more than 2,800 contracts filed with the Securities 
Exchange Commission in 2002, and found “[l]ittle evidence . . . to 
support the proposition that [public companies] routinely regard 
arbitration clauses as efficient or otherwise desirable contract 
terms.”59 Only 11 percent of contracts contained arbitration clauses.60 
Twenty percent of international contracts—those involving a non-
U.S. party—had arbitration clauses, which is higher than the overall 
rate, but nevertheless in “contrast[] with predictions that arbitration is 
the dispute resolution mechanism in international contractual settings, 
and that the vast majority of international contracts provide for 
binding arbitration.”61 
 
 55. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 636; see also BORN, supra 
note 2, at 47 (noting that most of the ICC’s cases are international disputes). 
 56. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 635 (citing KLAUS PETER 
BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 111 (1999)); see also 
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 347 (citing a study finding that from 1993 to 1996, fifteen 
of seventeen international joint venture agreements filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission included arbitration clauses, and another finding that more than eighty percent of 
private international contracts have arbitration clauses). 
 57. See Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 880 tbl.19. 
 58. See id. (illustrating results of the survey of 600 respondents). Although most 
respondents reported some use of alternatives to litigation, mediation—not arbitration—”was 
far and away the preferred ADR process.” Id. at 881. However, the study does find that 31.9 
percent of companies surveyed think that the presence of a non-U.S. party is a reason for 
picking arbitration. See Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 883 tbl.23. 
 59. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 335. 
 60. Id. at 350-52. 
 61. Id. 
WHYTOCK_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:24:59 PM 
2008] TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE LAW 463 
 
There are at least two possible explanations for the divergent 
findings about arbitration. One is that perceptions about the 
pervasiveness of arbitration may be driven at least in part by 
assumptions that overstate or over-generalize the benefits of 
arbitration relative to litigation, and therefore exaggerate the 
attraction of arbitration for transnational actors.62 But a more 
intriguing explanation for the divergent data on arbitration trends 
might be that there is indeed an emerging arbitration-based system of 
transnational private governance, but one in which U.S. parties do 
not participate as widely as European parties. Given the historical 
role of the United States in promoting transnational litigation,63 this 
would be surprising indeed. Yet the studies cited by Stone Sweet, 
which imply that arbitration is the norm in transnational dispute 
resolution, are largely European studies. In contrast, the Cornell 
University and Eisenberg and Miller studies, which suggest that 
arbitration is not so widespread, are essentially U.S. studies: the 
former is based on the practices of Fortune 1000 companies, which 
are U.S. companies,64 and the latter is based on an analysis of 
 
 62. For example, arbitration is not necessarily faster and cheaper than litigation; it is 
“seldom cheap” and “seldom speedy.” BORN, supra note 2, at 7-8. For these reasons, among 
others, “there is growing dissatisfaction with arbitral adjudication.” Thomas E. Carbonneau, 
Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1959 
(1996). Moreover, arbitrators lack coercive powers over third parties to compel their 
appearance as witnesses or as third-party defendants.  And even if the absence of a right of 
appeal is time-saving, it “means that a wildly eccentric, or simply wrong, arbitral decision cannot 
be corrected.” BORN, supra note 2, at 7. Perhaps most importantly, most of the advantages of 
arbitration are not generic to disputants; rather, the characteristics of arbitration are 
advantageous or disadvantageous relative to those of litigation depending on the disputants’ 
respective strategic interests—which cannot be assumed to be in alignment. As one leading 
expert on transnational litigation and arbitration puts it, “It would be imprudent to prescribe a 
single dispute resolution mechanism for all transactions or parties. There are too many 
variables, which counsel in different directions in different transactions for different parties.” Id. 
at 5. Corporate lawyers know that “the decision to include an arbitration provision in a 
commercial contract is complex and cannot be determined across the board.” Eisenberg & 
Miller, supra note 41, at 350; see also Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 1959 (“Unless the structure 
of arbitration is radically altered, it is not a suitable adjudicatory mechanism for every type of 
claim. One of the presumably lasting lessons of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
movement is precisely that there is no universal device for dispute resolution.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 782 (“[W]hen Wall Street lawyers finally 
accepted the primacy of arbitration in transborder commercial litigation, an even greater 
volume of international commercial litigation migrated from domestic courts to transborder 
arbitral tribunals.”); Mattli, supra note 38, at 921 (“In the United States, for example, the legal 
counsels of major corporations have spearheaded the recent trend away from . . . court 
proceedings toward . . . ADR.”). 
 64. See Fortune 500 Directory: FAQ Definitions and Explanations,  http://money.cnn.co-
WHYTOCK_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:24:59 PM 
464 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:449 
 
contracts filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.65 
Data collected by Walter Mattli on the origin of parties in ICC 
arbitration cases provides some additional support for the plausibility 
of this conjecture: since 1974, approximately fifty to sixty percent of 
the parties involved in ICC arbitration were from Western Europe, 
whereas only approximately ten to thirteen percent were from North 
America.66 
B. The Relationship between Litigation and Arbitration 
Even if transnational arbitration has substantially replaced 
transnational litigation, this would not necessarily imply a decline in 
the importance of transnational judicial governance and an escape 
from the transnational shadow of the law. Whether to draw these 
conclusions would depend on the relationship between domestic 
courts and transnational arbitration, particularly the extent to which 
transnational arbitration as a system of private governance itself 
depends on foundations provided by domestic courts. 
The architects of the modern system of transnational arbitration 
themselves recognized the foundational role of domestic courts, both 
as facilitators and monitors of the system. As Thomas Carbonneau 
puts it, “Sovereign state cooperation was indispensible to instituting 
the process. [Transnational commercial arbitration] needed the 
approbation of states to benefit from municipal courts’ status of 
legitimacy and their authority in order to function effectively as a 
transborder system.”67 In terms of facilitation, Articles II and III of 
the New York Convention establish a general rule requiring domestic 
courts to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. Articles 
II and V provide mechanisms for judicial monitoring of the system 
 
m/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/faq/ (“Included in the survey are U.S. incorporated 
companies filing financial statements with a government agency. This includes private 
companies and cooperatives that file a 10-K and mutual insurance companies that file with state 
regulators. Excluded are private companies not filing with a government agency; companies 
incorporated outside the U.S.; companies owned or controlled by other U.S. companies that file 
with a government agency; and U.S. companies owned or controlled by foreign companies.”). 
 65. The Eisenberg and Miller study separately analyzes international contracts—those 
involving at least one U.S. party. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 351 tbl. 3. But even 
contracts between U.S. and non-U.S. parties are likely to be influenced by U.S. business 
practices. 
 66. Mattli, supra note 38, at 940 tbl. 2. It is possible, however, that the higher participation 
rate of Western European parties could reflect the Western European headquarters of the ICC 
or a greater supply of disputes involving Western European parties. 
 67. Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 774-75. 
WHYTOCK_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:24:59 PM 
2008] TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE LAW 465 
 
through limited review of arbitration agreements and awards. Under 
Article II, a domestic court may review an agreement to arbitrate to 
determine whether “the said agreement is null and void, inoperative 
or incapable of being performed.” For its part, Article V permits a 
domestic court to decline enforcement of an arbitral award if it 
determines that “the subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country” or “the 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country.” 
Over time, however, transnational arbitration appears to have 
acquired a considerable degree of autonomy from the state.68 Today, 
“proponents of the Lex Mercatoria argue that state authorities have 
largely ‘relinquished their authority to regulate’ transnational 
contracting and arbitration, permitting both ‘to function 
autonomously’ in what is, in effect, an ‘a-national’ way.”69 
But what is the extent of this autonomy? According to what 
Stone Sweet calls the “traditionalist” view, arbitration fundamentally 
depends on states—particularly for enforcement.70 Carbonneau 
argues that transnational arbitration depends critically on a uniform 
law of arbitration “implemented by courts with the discipline of 
consistency and predictability.”71 Similarly, W. Michael Reisman 
argues that “[p]rivate international commercial arbitration depends, 
for its effectiveness, on substantial and predictable governmental and 
intergovernmental support. . . . There are many opportunities to 
frustrate an arbitration. National courts are the critical defense line 
 
 68. See generally Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35. But see W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND 
ARBITRATION 139 (1992) (“International commercial arbitration is a form of private 
international dispute resolution based on a network of public international agreements. It is 
neither self-sustaining nor autonomous . . . .”) 
 69. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 637 (citing THOMAS 
CARBONNEAU, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW 
MERCHANT (1997)). 
 70. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 637 (“Traditionalists tend to 
portray the Lex Mercatoria as a set of practices enabled by states. In their view, over time states 
have granted, within realms constructed through treaty law and national statute, more rather 
than less contractual autonomy to transnational economic actors, while retaining ultimate 
regulatory authority over these practices.”). 
 71. Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 801-03. See also id. at 807 (“[A] laissez-faire state policy 
in conjunction with universal contract law principles and the codification of basic regulatory 
principles through international instruments constitute the legal foundation for the process of 
ICA.”). 
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against such efforts.”72 According to Robert Wai: 
[I]nternational commercial arbitration still relies very much on 
the support of national legal systems. The ultimate authority for 
arbitration procedures is that they are recognized and 
supported by national legislative and judicial processes. 
Without the power of state legal systems behind them, a party 
who expects to do poorly in the arbitration will have no 
incentive to comply and may seek recourse to national legal 
systems. Consequently, international commercial arbitration 
operates very much ‘in the shadow of the law,’ and national 
laws continue to impose important limits.73 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that U.S. withdrawal from the New York 
Convention or, slightly less dramatically, a U.S. Supreme Court shift 
toward broad interpretation of the Convention’s exceptions to the 
general rule of judicial enforcement of arbitral awards, would not 
significantly affect arbitration as a system of transnational private 
governance. 
In theory, however, enforcement might not have to depend 
solely on state authority. As some scholars have noted, private 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards may be 
possible based on reputational sanctions.74 The logic is as follows: If 
an actor’s reputation for keeping its commitments is good, that 
reputation will increase the actor’s opportunities for entering 
profitable transactions with other actors who are aware of that 
reputation. If that reputation is bad, it will decrease those 
opportunities. Therefore, an actor’s reputation for keeping its 
commitments is a valuable asset. The actor has an incentive to keep 
its commitments—including agreements to arbitrate and abide by 
arbitral awards—because noncompliance will harm that reputation.75 
 
 72. REISMAN, supra note 68, at 107. 
 73. Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function 
of Private International law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 267 
(2001-02). 
 74. Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the 
Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 479 (1995) [hereinafter 
Benson I]; Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration in the Shadow of the Law, in NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW Vol. 1 93, 95 (1998) [hereinafter Benson II]; David 
Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990); Stone 
Sweet, Islands, supra note 35, at 325. 
 75. See Charny, supra note 74, at 393 (“[L]oss of reputation among market participants” is 
a type of nonlegal sanction, whereby “[t]he promisor develops a reputation for reliability among 
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The problem is that reputational sanctions are likely to be 
effective in only a narrow set of circumstances.76 For example, there 
must be a mechanism for disseminating information about parties’ 
behavior—information is, after all, the link between behavior and 
reputation.77 If A breaches an agreement to arbitrate with B, or 
refuses to comply with the resulting arbitral award, B obviously has 
knowledge of this, but absent such a mechanism, other actors do not 
necessarily have this knowledge, leaving A’s general reputation 
unharmed.78 One important value associated with arbitration—
confidentiality—makes it particularly challenging to satisfy the 
information requirement. Confidentiality aside, as the size of a 
community increases, it becomes increasingly difficult for any given 
actor to keep track of the conduct and reputations of others. There 
must also be a process for distinguishing valid and invalid reasons for 
noncompliance with arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, for 
only noncompliance which is understood by a community as 
unjustified is likely to harm a party’s reputation.79 In addition, parties 
 
market participants who are potential transactors. If the promisor improperly breaches his 
commitments, he damages his reputation and thereby loses valuable opportunities for future 
trade.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Equilibria and Equilibrium Institutions, in THE 
SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51, 71 (Herbert F. Weisberg ed., 1986) (“A reputation for honest dealings 
enhances one’s ability to enter into new cooperative ventures. . . . [I]f A reneges on his promise 
[to B], the prospect of B ever doing business again with A declines precipitously. Indeed, if A 
develops a reputation for reneging, then even those agents who have never been personally 
victimized by A will not enter into coalitions with him.”). 
 76. See Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide: 
Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 155, 174-75 (2004). 
 77. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 74, at 418 (“One key to effective reputational controls is a 
system for transmitting relevant information to market participants and for providing the 
expertise necessary to evaluate that information.”); Shepsle, supra note 75, at 72 (noting that the 
difficulty of indentifying cheaters reduces the effectiveness of reputational sanctions); Stone 
Sweet, Islands, supra note 35, at 325 (“This solution, of course, depends entirely on the 
organization of information and monitoring capacities, a collective good that, given the myriad 
costs involved, may or may not be generated by the traders themselves.”). A modern solution to 
this problem might be a web-based system for disseminating information, but it is difficult to 
imagine how such a system could effectively operate in support of reputational sanctions 
without foregoing confidentiality, which is one of the characteristics that make arbitration 
attractive in the first place. 
 78. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1823, 1862-63 (2002) (“The extent to which a violation is known by the relevant players 
affects the reputational consequences of the violation. Obviously, if a violation takes place, but 
no other state has knowledge of it, there is no reputational loss. The reputational consequences 
will also be less if only a small number of countries know of the violation.”). 
 79. As Shepsle explains, “Cheating is not dichotomous (cheat, not cheat) and there are 
many forms of opportunistic behavior. Legislator A, for example, pledges loyalty to his party, 
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must have a time horizon that is sufficiently long for them to 
incorporate the possibility of lost future business opportunities into 
their decisionmaking.80 
All of this suggests that outside the shadow of the law, 
transnational arbitration is likely to be an effective form of global 
governance only in relatively small, well-defined, and enduring 
communities, in which the parties have long time horizons and are 
able to monitor each other closely.81 Elsewhere, transnational judicial 
governance is likely to continue playing an important role, with 
domestic courts performing a governance support function by making 
themselves available for enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards. 
 
except on matters of conscience or constituency. But who is to determine when the exceptional 
circumstance has arisen?” Shepsle, supra note 75, at 72. Similarly, noncompliance with an 
agreement to arbitrate is not dichotomous: under the New York Convention, noncompliance is 
not “cheating” if, for example, the agreement to arbitrate “is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed” (Article II(3)), if the party lacked capacity to enter the 
agreement (Article V(1)(a)), if the arbitral decision was on a matter beyond the scope of the 
agreement (Article V(1)(c)), if the arbitral process was not in accordance with the agreement 
(Article V(1)(d))—all of which may be matters of good faith disagreement in particular cases. 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
July 6, 1988, arts. II,V, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/1958NYConvention.pdf.; See also 
Charny, supra note 74, at 418 (“One key to effective reputational controls is a system for 
transmitting relevant information to market participants and for providing the expertise 
necessary to evaluate that information.”) (emphasis added); Guzman, supra note 78, at 1861-62 
(noting that “minor violations have less reputational impact that major ones, good reasons for 
the violation may reduce reputational harm of a violation, and lack of clarity regarding the 
scope of an obligation reduces the reputational harm of violating it”). 
 80. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1659 (1996) (“The 
problem of cooperation is solvable in many repeated games when players commit to an 
enduring relationship, provided that they can observe each others’ moves and they do not 
discount the future too heavily.”) (emphasis added). 
 81. See Benson II, supra note 74, at 97 (“In general, a close-knit community of transactors 
can often offer private benefits and impose private sanctions that are sufficient to make 
arbitration a jurisdictional choice, thereby avoiding the shadow of the law. In the total absence 
of such a community . . . , arbitration may still survive if the state sanctions it as a procedural 
option.”); Charny, supra note 74, at 418-19 (“Collective reputational enforcement should work 
well in markets in which single, third-party decisionmakers wield nonlegal sanctions—that is, in 
markets limited to a small, homogenous group of individuals who are in frequent contact and 
thus can share relevant information. These markets are, of course, relatively rare. Conversely, 
mass markets based on reputational bonds are feasible only with technology that conveys 
information cheaply to a large group of transactors, such as computers used to monitor 
creditworthiness or mass media used in advertising.”); Stone Sweet, Islands, supra note 35, at 
325 (“Where contractants are not strangers, that is, where a pool of potential traders enjoys 
ongoing, face-to-face relations with each other within a shared normative framework, collective 
action problems and Prisoner’s Dilemmas are more easily overcome.”). 
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Even if domestic courts facilitate transnational arbitration by 
providing enforcement support, it is undeniable that domestic courts 
have, to a substantial degree, emancipated the arbitration process 
from judicial monitoring. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
narrowly construed the grounds for non-enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards, such as the public policy and non-
arbitrability exceptions.82 
But how closely does lower court practice conform to the 
Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration policy? A recent study concludes 
that in an increasing number of cases, lower courts are refusing to 
enforce arbitration agreements by finding them unconscionable under 
state contract law, at least in noncommercial cases.83 Does such a 
trend exist in cases involving transnational arbitration? An 
affirmative answer would suggest that the conventional wisdom may 
underestimate the autonomy of transnational arbitration from judicial 
monitoring, whereas a negative answer would support that wisdom. 
By seeking an answer based on systematic empirical evidence, 
scholars can improve their understanding of the relationship between 
transnational judicial governance and transnational arbitration. As 
Roscoe Pound put it, we need to understand not only law in books, 
but also law in action.84 
CONCLUSION 
Governance-oriented analysis of transnational law focuses not 
only on the implications of law for individual disputants in particular 
cases, but also for transnational activity more generally. It focuses not 
only on transnational legal rules, but also on how courts actually 
 
 82. See BORN, supra note 2, at 113 (“Most national courts have adopted narrow definitions 
of ‘public policy’ and ‘non-arbitrability’ as bases for denying enforcement to foreign arbitral 
awards.”); GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 1111 (4th ed. 2007) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 
(1974) and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)) 
(“During the 1980s, the [U.S.] Supreme Court brought the blossoming of the non-arbitrability 
doctrine to a fairly decisive end.”). 
 83. Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, 
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470-71 
(2006) (objecting to the trend). 
 84. See Pound, supra note 8, at 15 (“If we look closely, distinctions between law in the 
books and law in action, between the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and man 
and those that in fact govern them, will appear, and it will be found that today also the 
distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is often a very real and a very deep 
one.”). 
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apply those rules. It aims, in other words, to understand the 
transnational shadow of the law and transnational law in action. 
When one shifts from a disputant-oriented perspective to a 
governance-oriented perspective, the relationship between 
transnational litigation and transnational arbitration takes on new 
significance. This relationship not only has implications for the micro-
level decisions of individual disputants regarding the dispute 
resolution method that best advances their respective interests. It also 
has implications for global governance, that is, for how and by whom 
the rules of transnational activity are prescribed, applied, and 
enforced. 
By focusing on the empirical and theoretical limitations of 
various claims about the relationship between domestic courts and 
transnational arbitration, this article surely has muddied rather than 
cleared the water. But the analysis nevertheless leads to several 
propositions that can serve as focal points for further research. 
First, transnational arbitration is partially, but not completely, 
autonomous from transnational judicial governance. On the one 
hand, transnational arbitration has become increasingly autonomous 
from judicial monitoring—although at least one recent study suggests 
that the lower U.S. federal courts might not fully embrace the 
Supreme Court’s laissez-faire attitude toward arbitration.85 On the 
other hand, transnational litigation to an important extent still relies 
on domestic courts for enforcement.86 This does not mean that 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards necessarily go unheeded 
without judicial recourse. Rather, because of the strong pro-
enforcement policy embodied by U.S. Supreme Court precedents, 
transnational actors expect that domestic courts ordinarily will 
enforce these agreements and awards, and are therefore more likely 
to comply with them voluntarily.87 
It is more by creating this knowledge than by providing 
enforcement in particular cases that domestic courts support 
arbitration as a system of transnational private governance. And it is 
in this sense that not only disputants, but also the system of 
transnational arbitration itself, operate in the transnational shadow of 
 
 85. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra notes 66-81, and accompanying text. 
 87. However, if transnational actors believe that lower courts are not as adamantly pro-
arbitration as the U.S. Supreme Court, this knowledge may not be so certain, and one might 
expect rates of compliance without judicial recourse to decline. 
WHYTOCK_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:24:59 PM 
2008] TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE LAW 471 
 
domestic law.88 From a governance-oriented perspective, then, shifts 
from litigation to arbitration may in fact vindicate transnational 
judicial governance, by suggesting that even if it is not playing the 
same direct transnational dispute resolution role that it once did, the 
importance of its governance support function is increasing. 
Second, it follows that transnational arbitration is probably 
better characterized as a “mixed” rather than a purely private form of 
governance.89 Governance involves the setting, application, and 
enforcement of rules.90 Insofar as transnational arbitration involves 
the application by a nonstate arbitrator of privately set rules (such as 
lex mercatoria), and the private enforcement of the resulting arbitral 
awards, it can be understood as a system of private governance. But 
purely private forms of transnational arbitration are probably rare. 
For one thing, in practice, private actors often select state law as the 
governing law.91 The most fundamental challenge for a truly 
autonomous system of private governance is, however, enforcement. 
Private enforcement may be possible on the basis of reputational 
sanctions, but only under particular circumstances which are not 
likely to exist except within relatively small and enduring 
communities.92 Therefore, as just discussed, transnational arbitration 
generally continues to rely on domestic court enforcement, and to 
that extent, it retains an important public dimension. 
 
 88. See REISMAN, supra note 68, at 9 (“[T]he assistance of national courts is necessary for 
enforcement and . . . the expectation of the probability of that enforcement is a key factor in 
‘voluntary’ compliance.’”); Wai, supra note 73, at 267 (noting the that transnational arbitration 
relies very much on the support of domestic legal systems, and arguing that “international 
commercial arbitration operates very much ‘in the shadow of the law.’”). 
 89. For that matter, transnational judicial governance also is a mixed public-private form of 
governance. Although public officials (judges) apply the rules, the rules are typically state rules, 
and enforcement (if necessary) is by the state, private litigants are ordinarily the ones that 
initiate the transnational litigation process. See SHAPIRO AND STONE SWEET, supra note 35, at 
293 (“litigants activate courts”). 
 90. See, e.g., KJAER, supra note 10, at 10 (defining governance as “the setting of rules, the 
application of rules, and the enforcement of rules”). 
 91. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 503, 519 (1995). One prominent practitioner advises against selecting “lex 
mercatoria” as applicable law: “Except in unusual cases, these formulations should be resisted. 
There is much academic debate, but little judicial authority, about what they mean, and there 
are doubts about how widely they are enforceable (e.g., English courts in particular have 
expressed reservations). Save where there is some powerful countervailing reason, business 
enterprises should not expose themselves to the uncertainties or expenses that participation in 
this scholastic debate could entail.” BORN, supra note 2, at 121. 
 92. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text. 
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This suggests that beyond separate studies of litigation and 
arbitration, future research should focus on the complex relationship 
between these forms of transnational dispute resolution and the 
global governance mechanisms—transnational judicial governance 
and transnational private governance—that they support. At the 
heart of the relationship is a paradox: arbitration both provides a 
partial escape mechanism from, and substantially relies upon, the 
transnational shadow of domestic law. A better understanding of this 
relationship promises to shed light on broader questions about the 
relationship between public and private authority in global 
governance.93 
Third, from a governance-oriented normative perspective, it is 
precisely this “odd relationship between the public and private”94—
this combination of minimal judicial monitoring and strong judicial 
support——that raises concerns.95 As A. Claire Cutler argues: 
Curiously, national government officials are participating in the 
expansion of the private sphere and the neutralization and 
insulation of international commercial concerns from public 
policy review. However, this insulation is incomplete, for state 
authority over the enforcement of private settlements has been 
strengthened as states undertake the binding commitment to 
enforce foreign arbitral awards. State authority has thus been 
curtailed in the settlement of substantive commercial legal 
issues and disputes, but expanded in the enforcement of the 
 
 93. As Tim Büthe puts it, claims about the rise of private authority leave open a number of 
important questions: “What is the role of the state in this empowerment of private actors? And 
can states take back the authority thus granted to private actors? Does the increase in private 
authority have a lasting effect on the role of states in international governance?” Tim Büthe, 
Governance Through Private Authority: Non-State Actors in World Politics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 281, 
284 (2004). 
 94. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come out Ahead in Alternative Judicial 
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 31 (1999) (“[S]ome have 
argued that the state has, in effect, privatized the dispute resolution system, providing an odd 
relationship between the public and private dimensions of the legal system.”). 
 95. More generally, Cutler et al. argue that “we should be concerned about the increase in 
private international authority on a number of counts. First, what does this mean for the 
continued functioning and existence of the state itself? Second, who gets to participate in 
making decisions given that corporations are not democracies? Third, are the rules the private 
sector establishes fair and equitable, incorporating mechanisms for access and accountability?” 
A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter, The Contours and Significance of Private 
Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 333, 
369 (A. Claire Cutler Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999). 
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final awards.96 
According to Cutler, “At the heart of these transformations is 
the global mercatocracy, an elite association of public and private 
organizations engaged in the unification and globalization of 
transnational merchant law”97 seeking to “free [transnational 
commercial activity] from democratic and social control,”98 in 
furtherance of a “neoliberal” ideological agenda99 and representing 
not a “globalization of legal culture” but rather a “globalization of 
localized US commercial culture and practices.”100 
While arguing that “[i]t is inaccurate and unfair to criticize 
international arbitration as a ‘Northern’ mechanism that silences or 
muffles the diversity of the world community,”101 Carbonneau agrees 
that “[p]rivately funded, nonpublic, nonnormative alternatives are 
simply not an adequate substitute for the public mission of the law.”102 
For his part, Robert Wai argues that internationalist private law 
reforms—including legal support for a shift from state-based litigation 
to private arbitration103—have “increased the autonomy of 
transnational business actors without an equivalent increase in 
transnational regulation,”104 enabling “the transnational liftoff of 
international business transactions from national regulatory 
 
 96. CUTLER, supra note 1, at 226. 
 97. Id. at 180-81. 
 98. Id. at 183. 
 99. Id. at 227.  See also Nölke & Graz, supra note 31, at 18-19 (“[T]ransnational private 
governance is not only supported by neoliberalism, but can also be viewed as its supporter, by 
contributing to its stabilization. In other words, they are mutually reinforcing. . . . Neoliberalism 
as an economic program is not equally benevolent to all parts of the business community. It 
generally favours big, transnationally mobile companies, in particular capital investors. The 
same can be stated for transnational private governance. One overriding concern . . . is that such 
governance particularly favours large and well-established multinational companies, in 
particular those from North America and the European Union (citation omitted).”). 
 100. CUTLER, supra note 1, at 235 (italics omitted). For other accounts of the rise of 
transnational arbitration, see DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 34, and Wai, supra note 73. 
 101. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1183, 1196 (2004). 
For an example of Carbonneau’s thoughts on improving the system of international arbitration, 
see Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 818-24 (proposing a modestly enhanced form of judicial 
review of arbitral awards). 
 102. Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 1962. 
 103. See Wai, supra note 73, at 220-22. Wai focuses principally on “the role of state actors—
in particular legislators and courts—in promoting or acquiescing in the ‘transnational liftoff’ of 
arbitration and the use of non-state norms for resolving transnational civil and commercial 
disputes.” See id. at 222. 
 104. Id. at 273. 
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oversight.”105 According to Wai, the underlying “goals of commerce, 
cooperation, and cosmopolitan fairness are important, but they can 
exclude other worthwhile policy objectives such as distributive justice, 
democratic political governance, or effective transnational 
regulation.”106 Thus, at least one leading scholar of ADR argues that 
“the time may be ripe—at both the transborder and domestic levels—
to refine the basis for the exercise of judicial supervision in 
arbitration . . . .”107 
Underlying these particular concerns is a more general concern 
about negative externalities: that private arbitration fails to address 
the negative consequences that disputants’ transnational activity may 
have on third parties.108 Thus, it might seem sensible for the presence 
or absence of negative externalities to inform judicial review of 
arbitral awards, perhaps in the context of the New York Convention’s 
existing public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitral 
awards.109  However, such an approach would be difficult to reconcile 
with the Supreme Court’s very narrow reading of the Convention’s 
exceptions to enforcement, and would likely be controversial in light 
of the widespread understanding that the success of arbitration is 
largely due to this narrow reading.110 
 
 105. Id. at 212. 
 106. Id. at 231. 
 107. Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 818.  See generally id. at 821-22 (“A possible statutory 
provision . . . might read: An international arbitral award can be denied recognition and/or 
enforcement in the requested jurisdiction if the reviewing court determines . . . that the 
arbitrators failed to follow or observe a material part or provision of the arbitration agreement 
relating to choice-of-law, damages, or the agreement’s scope of application.”); Carbonneau, 
supra note 101, at 1206-08 (proposing “a new form of public regulation of the arbitral process 
and of arbitrators” focused on the professional skills of arbitrators). 
 108. Robert Cooter refers to the more general problem of spill-over: “In some 
circumstances, state enforcement of social norms is unfair. Some norms that are good for one 
community are bad for another community. For example, one community may develop a norm 
that externalizes cost on another community, or one community may develop a norm that 
inhibits competition from another community. Such a norm is unfair from the viewpoint of the 
community harmed by it. The state cannot justify enforcing a norm that harms one community 
on the grounds that it arose from a consensual process in another community.” Cooter, supra 
note 80, at 1684. 
 109. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 
V(2)(b), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. For example, the absence of negative externalities 
might favor enforcement of arbitral awards, while their presence—unless adequately addressed 
in the award—might favor non-enforcement. 
 110. Such a proposal would also raise difficult questions about how judges would determine 
whether arbitral awards in particular cases address the problem of negative externalities. 
Perhaps most problematic, because judicial review of arbitral awards is initiated by one or more 
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Finally, what do we really know about transnational litigation 
and transnational judicial governance, transnational arbitration and 
transnational private governance, and the relationships between 
them? This article suggests that we may know less than we think. But 
it also suggests that it is important to learn more. Doing so will 
require us to rely not only on anecdotes and intuition, but also 
systematic empirical evidence. Using governance-oriented analysis, 
we need to focus not only on transnational law in books—including 
the domestic and international law of arbitration—but also 
transnational law in action. 
Mnookin and Kornhauser concluded their seminal article as 
follows: “Theoretical and empirical research concerning how people 
bargain in the shadow of law should provide us with a richer 
understanding of how the legal system affects behavior, and should 
allow a more realistic appraisal of the consequences of reform 
proposals.”111 Likewise, research on how actors bargain in the 
transnational shadow of domestic law—including bargaining over 
arbitration itself—should improve our understanding of transnational 
activity, including the role of both domestic courts and private 
arbitrators in governing that activity. 
 
 
of the private disputants themselves, it is likely that the number of awards actually reviewed 
based on a “negative externalities” principle would represent only a small portion of the total 
number of awards in cases involving negative externalities. 
 111. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 997. 
